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Problems about the circle of persons who can limit their liability.
Should the mortgagee in possession of a ship be allowed to
limit? What about clairns for the raising and remoual of sunken
uessels oredered by the harbour authority? Ambiguities in the
wording of the conduct barring limitation.. Burden of proof and
set-off of claim and counterclaim. Reconciling po,ssenger claims
of the 1976 Limitation Conuention and the 1974 Passenger
Conuention.
Generally speaking, it is characteristic of modern man that he wants
to limit liability for his actions and, if possible, even to disclaim his
responsibility for them by blaming somebody else like society, the genetic
code, education or the political system. Such a desire is especially present
in our technolo$cal society where even a seemingly insignificant act or
omission is frequently fraught with unforeseeable consequences. While this
phenomenon of a deep anxiety of modern freedom could profitably be
investigated by sociologists and philosophers, lawyers look at it usually
from a more pragmatic point of view and try to. make it dovetail with
the prevailing economic trends. The case in point is the shipowner's
limitation of liability. The basic idea behind the right to limit their liability
was to encourage shipowners to carry on their business in the adventurous
pursuit of seafaring. It could, however, be asked, whether nowadays, with
such a widely branched out system of insurance, limitation of liability is
still needed. Although the argument against limitation carries considerable
theoretical weight, one must admit that in the present circumstances of
maritime trade it would be self- defeating in practice to saddle shipowners
with unlimited liability which they would try to circumvent by forming
one-ship companies or by throwing the increase of their insurance costs
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on the end-users of their seryices. These pragmatic grounds, however, do
not deprive ethical questions about the admissibility of an entrepreneur's
limitation of liability for his acts or omissions, and for those of his
employees acting within the scope of their employment, of serious weight
and significance.
The latest international instrument to regulate liability for maritime
claims is the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims
drawn up in London in 1976. It introduced some radical changes in the
concept and scope of limitation. After the Convention was concluded some
alterations of other instruments of international maritime law have taken
place which must be harmonized with the provision of the L976 Limitation
Convention. Its revision is, therefore, necessary, especially in order to
reconcile its enactments in respect of passenger claims for loss of life and
personal injury with the provisions of the Convention on the Carriage of
Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea concluded in Athens in L974 and
amended by . Protocol in 1990. But there are also some other ambiguities
in the 1976 Limitation Convention which should be reviewed and then
differently worded or even modified in substance. In this paper I shall
indicate some of these unclarities which would require a reconsideration.
WHO CAN LIMIT?
Under the 1976 Convention any person for whose act, neglect or default
the shipowner or salvor is responsible can avail himself of the limitation
of liability. Some questions could arise regarding the circle of persons who
can limit their liability. If the word "responsible" is widely interpreted,
independent contractors, such as stevedores, are included, which they would
not be if the term "responsible" is given a restricted interpretation, because
it is obvious that the stevedore is not a "servant" of the shipowner. The
wording of article t of the Convention has in some respect even reduced
the circle of persons who are entitled to limit their liability. While it is
apparently wide enough to include even agents if the shipowner is responsible
for their actions, it certainly excludes the mortgagee in possession, because
the mortgagee who has the possession of a ship does not normally "operate"
her, and hence cannot be subsumed under article 1(2) of the Convention.
It is also evident that the shipowner cannot be said to be "responsible"
for the mortgagee in possession. And yet the mortgagee in possession
should have the right to limit his liability for maritime claims.
It must be mentioned in this connection that the position of a
master-owner seeking to limit his liability has been improved by this
Convention in relation to the provisions of the L957 Limitation Convention,
because it is no longer required that he commit the act,.neglect or default
in his capacrty as master, the only bar to limitation being now his intent
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to cause loss or his recklessness and knowledge that such loss would
probably result from his personal act or omission (article 4). A welcome
innovation of the 1976 Convention is also the right of the liability insurer
to benefit from it regarding claims subject to limitation "to the same extent
as the assured himself'. This wording obviously does not denote that if
the assured cannot limit his liability and must pay in full to a third party
claimant, his liability insurer also couldn't limit his liability to such third
party when, according to the insurance contract, the assured has lost his
insurance cover because of his privity in causing the loss or damage.
CI,AIMS SI]BJECT TO LIMITATION
Under article 2(1Xd) and 2(2) of the convention claims in respect of
the raising, removal, destruction or the rendering harmless of a sunken,
wrecked, stranded or abandoned ship are subject to limitation regardless
of the basis of liability, even if brought by way of recourse or indemnity
under a contract or otherwise, with certain exclusions. Accordingly, Iiability
for claims regarding the expenses of wreck removal could be limited, even
if such a removal was performed pursuant to an order by the harbour
authority. Some countries, among them Croatia, have not included the
claims enuerated in article 2(1)(d) of the L976 Convention in the list of
claims subject to limitation see article 408 of the Croatian Maritime Code).
Although according to article 811 of the quoted Code remuneration for
the raising of a sunken vessel cannot exceed the value of the raised ship,
the raising or removal of vessels pursuant to statutory powers of the
harbour authority is not subject to this limitation. It could be argued that
claims for the raising and removal of wrecked, sunken, stranded or
abandoned vessels, performed following an order of a competent administrative
authority, should be excluded from limitation, because removal expenses
in such cases are either defrayed by a special state or government fund
which then should be able to recover them in full, or - where such funds
do not exist - unlimited liability of the owner of the sunken vessel is the
most powerful incentive to the specialised firm for performing the task of
the raising or removal Article 18 of the t976 Convention gives any state
party to the Convention the right to exclude from the application of the
convention claims in respect of the raising, removal, destruction or rendering
harmless of a ship which is sunk, wrecked, stranded or abandoned, including
anything that is or has been on her board.
It is interesting to observe that article 2(1Xa) of the Convention could
introduce a change in the regime of the limitation of liability of tug and
tow towards third vessels. As the law now stands, this regime is not a
paragon of justice and fairness, because a small tug of comparatively
insignificant value towing a big vessel can cause great damage and pay
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for it very little. The present position is, namely, that since the negligence
which caused the damage, say thorugh a collision, must be in the navigation
or management of the vessel at fault in order for that vessel to be able
to limit her liability, the limitation fund should be restricted only to the
tonnage of that vessel in the towing unit which caused the damage to a
third ship through navigational negligence. If, however, the 1976 Convention
applies, the party wishing to limit liability has only to show that the
damage arose "in direct connection with the operation of the ship". So if
we take a case where only the tug is to blame for a collision with a third
vessel, there appeErs now to be less reason to restrict the fund to the
usually insignificant tonnage of the tug alone, because there is no danger
any more in the L976 Convention that in such a case the tow, if also
held responsible, would be subject to unlimited liability. In order to limit
her liability the tow has now only to show that the Iiability arose in
direct connection with the operation of the ship, and not, as earlier, in
connection with the navigation or management of the shipl.
CLAIMS EXCEPTED FROM LIMITATION
The Convention provides in article 3(e) that its rules shall not apply,
among others, to claims put forward by servants of the shipowner or
salvor whose duties are connected with the ship or salvage operations,
including claims of their heirs, dependants or other persons entitled to
make such claims, if under the law governing the contract of service
between the shipowner or salvor and such servants the shipowner or salvor
is not entitled to limit his liability in respect of such claims, or if he is
by such law only permitted to limit his liability to an amount greater
than that provided for in the Convention. It is, therefore, clear, that the
exception applies only if the law governing the contract of service prohibits
this limitation or sets a higher limit, and not merely because the contract
itself provides for a higher limit or excludes it altogether. Yet it could be
asked, why is the will of the parties expressed in the contract of service
not sufficient to have this effect, especially since it is not a question of
lowering the limit prescribed by the Convention but of making it higher
or totally abolishing it? It should be mentioned here, that according to
Croatian law such claims are excepted from limitation2. Perhaps in a future
revision of the L976 Limitation Convention article 3(e) could be rephrased
to except from limitation claims by servants of the shipowner or salvor
whose duties are connected with the ship or salvage operations, including
1 CF. Branimir Luk5ii, Collision liability of tug and tow in maritime law, in "Comparative
Maritime Law", Zagreb 1991, No. 3-4, p. 239.
2 Article 409 of the Croatian Maritime Code which came into force on 22nd of March
1994.
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claims of their heirs, dependants or other persons entitled to make such
claims, if under the contract of service between the shipowner or salvor
and such seryants, or the law governing such contract of service, the
shipowner or salvor is not entitled to limit his liability in respect of such
claims, or if he is only permitted to limit his liability to an amount greater
than that provided for by the Convention.
CONDUCT BARRING LIMITATION
The limitation regime of the L976 Convention is an ingenious combination
of the establishment of a very high limitation fund, perhaps as high as
a shipowner can cover by liability insurance at an acceptable cost, and of
the creation of a practically unbreakable right of the shipowner to limit
his liability. The conduct barring limitation adopted by the 1976 Convention
was adopted earlier by a number of other international instruments, among
them by the Hague-Visby Rules of 1968, by the 1974 Athens Convention
on the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea and by the 1978
Hamburg Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea. Yet there are
certain differences among these conventions regarding the conduct which
would prevent limitation of liability. Whereas the Hague-Visby Rules and
the Athens Convention speak of the damage resulting from an act or
omission of the carrier, the L976 Convention speaks of "a person liable".
This liable person could be the shipowner, the charterer, manager, operator,
salvor or liability insurer of the vessel, or anyone of the class described
as persons for whose act, neglect or default the shipowner or salvor is
responsible. A personal act of any of the above mentioned persons will
prevent him from limiting his own liability if a claim is lodged against
him, but the liability insurer of the vessel will presumably be prevented
to do so not so much by his personal misconduct as by that of his assured.
Furthermore, the L976 Convention provides in article 4 that the person
liable shall not be entitled to limit his liability if it is proved that he
acted either intentionally or recklessly and with knowledge to cause "such
loss". It could be argued that the term "such loss" prevents the person
liable from limiting his liability only if he intended or anticipated the
actual loss suffered by the claimant, in other words, only if he intended
or anticipated that loss which is known to be the probable result of his
misconduct. Of the above mentioned conventions the Hague-Visby Rules
in article IV, rule 5(e) provide that the right of limitation is lost only if
the carrier acted with knowledge that "damage would probably result", the
1974 Athens Convention makes the loss of the carier's right to limit
liability dependent on his intent to cause "such damage" or on his knowledge
that "such damage would probably result" (article 13(1)), while the Hamburg
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Rules have similar wording to the L976 Limitation Convention and mention
intent to cause "such loss, damage or delay" and knowledge that "such
loss, damage or delay would probably result" (article 8, rule 1). It is
submitted that the wording of the 1976 Convention unnecessarily restricts
the scope of the liable person's unlimited liability and that the Convention
should refer simply to "loss" or "damage". By such a revision the shipowner's
or salvor's right to limit liability would be lost if he intended to cause
any loss, or if he acted recklessly and with knowledge that any loss would
probably result, regardless of the fact that the actually inflicted loss was
not the same as the intended or foreseen one.
There is antother problem which must be considered in connection with
article 4 of the L976 Limitation Convention. The word "reckless" means
lacking in caution, foolhardy, rash, careless, heedless or irresponsibly wild3.
But over and above these connotations it has something more, a specifically
English tang, a faint suggestion of something outrageous which is
untranslatable in most other languages. An instance of this is the Croatian
Maritime Code which translates "recklessness" as "gross negligence"4.
Consequently, according to Croatian law a shipowner could not limit his
liability if he was guilty of a grossly negligent act or omission, while
according to, say, English law as contained in the Merchant Shipping Act
1979 which adopted en bloc the 1976 Limitation Convention, such shipowner
could limit his liability, because in order that his misconduct be considered
reckless something more is needed than mere negligence, namely an element
of heedlessness which puts a reckless act halfway between intent and
negligence5. On the other side of the liabiliy spectrum, the word "recklessness"
is not synonymous with "wilful misconduct" because it lacks the element
of the full cognition of the harmfulness of the act and the element of
clear intentionalityG. This linguistic difficulty will plague all countries whose
legal terminology is based on civil law tradition when they try to translate
the terms used by the L976 Limitation Convention in article 4.
But in view of the present predominant standing of the common law
countries within the arena of international maritime law, it is hardly
realistic to expect that in the near future the IMO and other international
bodies will temper the wind to those other shorn lambs.
3 Webster's Third New International Dictionary.
4 Article 410.
5 Cf. Velimir Filipovid, What is new in the Maritime Code in relation to the global
Iimitation of the operator's liability, "Comparative Maritime Law", Zagreb 1994, No. 1-4, p.
98-99.
6 For a more detailed analysis of these terms see Branimir Luk5i6, Limitation of
Iiability for the raising and removal of ships and wrecks, in "Journal of Maritime Law and
Commerce", Washington D. C. 1980, Vol. 12, No. 1.
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THE BURDEN OF PROOF
The 1976 Convention places in the same article 4 the onus of proof
of the shipowner's or salvor's subjective intent or of his subjective knowledge
that loss would probaby result on the person who challenges the right to
limit. This construction gives at the outset the challenger very poor chance
of succeeding, since it is extremely difficult with circumstantial evidence
to convince the court that one knows the tortfeasor's subjective reasoning
and his intent. This difficulty must be added to the even greater one of
actually knowing what goes on in the mind of another person, expecially
if that person was miles away from the shore when the act or omission
which caused damage took place. This is a complete reversal of the
provisions of the 1957 Limitation Convention according to which the
shipowner has to satisfy the court that there was no fault or privity on
his part in order to be entitled to limit his liability. The knowledge must
be actual and not constructive or merely possible in view of the surrounding
circumstances, because only subjective guilt bars limitation and the so-called
objectivised guilt is not enough?.
SET.OFF
It seems that the set-off provision in article 5 of the Convention has
not the most felicitous wording, and if compared to the analogous provision
of the L957 Convention (article 1(5)) it could have certain undesired effects.
When the 1957 Convention speaks of claims and counterclaims arising out
of the same occurrence and being able to be set-off against each other so
that limitation applies only to the balance, if any, it applies this provision
to the shipowner. In the L976 Convention the provision applies to "a
person entitled to limitation of liability", which means not only the
shipowner, but also the charterer, manager, operator and salvor. With this
widening of the circle of persons, the words "arising out of the same
occurrence" could actually hinder some of them from setting-off claim and
counterclaim. Take, for example, the case where a shipowner has a
counterclaim against a salvor for negligence in the performance of salvage.
If the L976 Convention should apply the salvor could set-off his claim for
remuneration for salvage services against the shipowner's counterclaim for
negligence and then he would be able to limit his liability to the balance
of damages, if any, which he owes to the shipo''nner. But he would very
probably be deprived of this right because it could be hardly said that
his claim for salvage remuneration arises out of tire sarne occurrence as
the shipowner's claim for negligence. The salvor's claim arises out of a
Cf. Branimir Luk$i6, Limitation of liabiiity for maritime claims, in "Priweda i Pravo",
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contract of salvage and the shipowner's out of the salvor's negligent act.
Therefore, Iimitation would probably have to be appliefd before set-off,
because the claim and counterclaim did not arise out of "the same
occurrence"S Or if these two grounds of obligation ought to be taken as
arising out of the same occurrence, then the article would gain from a
clearer wording, perhaps by the words "arising out of or in connection
with the same occurrence".
THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY
The L976 Limitation Convention chose a sliding scale with various
layers of limit depending on the vessel's tonnage, and did not accept a
flat rate for eache ton. It also provides that the unit of account shall be
the special drawing right (SDR) the value of which is to be determined
by the value of the applied currency at the date the limitation fund shall
have been constituted, or at the date when payment is made or when
security is given which under the law of that state is equvalent to such
payment (article 8). Separate limitation funds are provided in respect of
claims for loss of life or personal injury and in respect of "arry other
claims". Where the amount calculated for loss of life or personal injury is
insufficient to cover the claims in fuII, the unpaid balance ranks rateably
with the other claims when the fund for these other claims is being
distributed. But if the occurrence did not give rise to these "other claims"
and if there is a balance of personal injury claims left unsatisfied, this
balance remains unpaid, because its rateable ranking with "other claims"
applies only if there are "other claims". The linguistic construction of article
6(2) is not in this respect very clear and a revision of the wording would
be desirable.
Since the Convention gives a fixed calculation of the Iimit of liability
for "any" salvor not operating from a ship, it may be sometimes disputable
in practice when a salvor is operating from a ship and when not, whether
he can be at one time operating from a ship and at another not, and
how to consider a salvor who operates as a frogman although he came
to the site as a member of the salvage team on a shipg.
More important is the problem of harmonizing the provision of this
Convention regarding the liability for passenger claims with that of the
L974 Athens Passenger Convention. The Athens Convention had the same
limit of 46,666 units of account per passenger before the limit was raised
to 175,000 units of account by the 1990 Protocol of that Convention. The
8 Cf. Patric Griggs & Richard Williams, Limitation of
Lloyd's of London Press 1986, p. 36/37.
I Cf. Christopher Hill, Maritime law, Lloyd's of London
80
liability for maritime claims,
Press 1985, p. 208.
B. Luk5i6: Why is a Review of the 19?6 Convention on Limitation of Liability Desirable?, IIPP v. 37 ., (7.-4.),73-
82, (1995)
problem is that the limit of the Athens Convention is to apply to each
passenger who claims damages, which means that it will be elastic and
flexible and will vary in accordance with the number of passengers who
claim damages, while the limit of the 1976 Limitation Convention is fixed
in advance at an amount obtained by multiplying the prescribed number
of units of account by an abstract number of passengers, i.e. by the
number of passengers which the ship is authorised to carry in accordance
with her certificate. Furthermore, the limit of the Athens Convention
applies "per carriage" (this is reproduced also in the 1990 Protocol to that
convention), which means the whole period during which a passenger is
being transported, while the limit of the 7976 Limitation Convention applies
to "any distinct occasion" and there may be more such distinct occasions
on one voyage. In practice this means the following: if the limit of the
Lg76 Convention is more favourable to the shipowner it would probably
apply by virtue of article 19 of the Athens Convention which provides
that the Athens Convention shall not modify the rights or duties of the
carrier under the international convention relating to the limitation of
liability of owners of seagoing ships. But if according to the 1976 Limitation
Convention the limit of liability would be higher the provisions of the
tg74 Athens Convention shall not override the application of that higher
limit and of the 1976 Convention. There is, therefore, an urgent need to
harmonize in these points the two mentioned conventions not only by
raising the limit per passenger in the L976 Limitation Convention to
correspond to the altered limit of the Athens Convention, but also in
regard to the calculation of the maximum amount of passenger claims. In
such a revision of the 1976 Convention the 25 million limit in article 7
would also need to be abolished.
THE LIMITATION FUND
It is foreseen in the 1976 Convention that the limitation of liability
may be invoked notwithstanding that a limitation fund has not been
constituted. Croatian law has availed itself of this possibility and has
enacted such a provision in article 415 of its Maritime Code. It has been
correctly and pertinently pointed out that such a provision is not in the
interest of the Republic of Croatia and its ecological policy, for in the
case of the pollution of the Croatian territorial sea by foreign vessels the
foreign shipowner could limit his tiability without having to set up the
limitation fund for the clean-up costs and expenses, and this would
essentially jeopardize the possibility of enforcing a decision on damagesl0.
10 Cf. Velimir Filipovii, What
limitation of the operator's liability,
p. 100.
is new in the Maritime Code in relation to the global
in "Comparative Maritime Law", Zagreb 1994, No. 1-4,
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If, before the fund is distributed, the person liable or his insurer, has
settled a claim against the fund, he ac5ruires by subrogation the right of
the person whose claim bas been settled. The Convention provides that
even other persons, and not only the person liable or his insurer, may
exercise the right of subrogation in respect of the claims whieh they may
have paid, this, however, only to the extent that such subrogation is
perrnitted under the applicable national law (article 12(3)). This innovation
introduced by the L976 Convention does not apply to volunteers who pay
a claim, only to those who have some legal ground to pay it, yet who
are not "liable" for it in the strict sense of the term. However, the
Convention does not make it clear whether the "applicable national law"
is a reference to the Iaw of the country where the fund is constituted or
of the country which has jurisdiction over the transaction giving rise to
the right of subrogation. According to article 3(3) of the L957 Convention
it was the national }aw of the state where the fund has been constituted.
Article 417 of the Croatian Maritime Code is also hazy on this point and
provides that the right of subrogation for other persons shall exist only
"insofar as such a subrogation is allowed", from which wording it cannot
be conclusively deduced which law is applicable. Since the 1976 Limitation
Convention has a slightly different wording from the L957 Limitation
Convention, it is submitted that it refers to the law of the country which
has jurisdiction over the transaction which gave rise to the subrogation.
In a revision of the L976 Convention this doubt could be dispelled by a
more precise formulation.
Sai,etak
z*5TO JE POTREBNI REVIDIRATI KIIwENCIJU o OGRAT{IEENJU
ODGOVORNOS?Y ZA POMORSKE TRAZBINE IZ 1976?
Konuenciju o ogrflniienju od,gouornosti za pomorske traZbine iz 1976. potrebno
je reuidirati hako zbog r{enog ushladiuanja sa Konuencijorn o prijeuozu putnika i
njihoue prtljage nxorenx iz 1974. i njenim Protoholom iz 1990., taho i zbog nekih
nedoreienosti san'te Konuencije iz 1976. Te se nedoreienosti poglauito tiiu nehih
pitanja glede kruga osoba hoje smiju ograniiiti odgouornost te glede stanouitih
traibina hoje su podloZne ograniienju i izuzete od njega. Autor nadalje ukazuje rua
stanouite naielne poteihode hod honuencijshih odredaba o gubitku prauq, na ograniienje
odgouornosti i na netoinost recepcije tih odredaha u hruatshi Pomorshi m,honik. On
upozorauo, rua potrebu uede jasnoie u formulaciji odredaba o.prebijanju traibina i
protutro.ibina, o fondu za ograniienje odgouornosti te na nuinost reuizije odredaba
honuencije glede potraiiuanja za smrt i tjelesne ozljede putniha.
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